Two Tables, Two Different Kinds of Power

There is a table where governments negotiate fishing rights.

There is another where governments, development agencies, businesses, and regional organizations discuss cooperation.

The distinction matters.

In December 1994, Canada and France signed an agreement promoting cooperation between Atlantic Canada and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. It established a Joint Cooperation Commission to encourage economic, environmental, cultural, transportation, and other partnerships.¹

But the agreement contains an important distinction.

Article 2 directs fisheries relations into a separate arrangement under the 1972 Canada–France fisheries agreement. Article 14 assigns fisheries matters to the advisory machinery established under that separate arrangement.¹

The economic-development table and the fisheries-management table are not the same table.

They may involve overlapping governments, institutions, and commercial interests, but they do not possess identical authority.

A regional commission can encourage partnerships. It cannot simply allocate a fish stock.

A company can propose a fishery. It cannot confer a legal fishing right on itself.

A government can announce an intention. That does not necessarily mean a licence has been issued.

And a coastal community can be profoundly affected by a decision without possessing a formal vote in the international negotiations that produce it.

That is where this final chapter of the Saint-Pierre fisheries series begins.

Saint-Pierre Is French, but It Does Not Decide Everything

Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon is a French overseas collectivity governed under Article 74 of the French Constitution.

It possesses its own territorial council, two communes, elected representatives, and locally administered responsibilities. Its institutions can pursue economic development, support fishing enterprises, and advocate for the archipelago's interests.

But Saint-Pierre is not a sovereign country.

The French state is represented locally by the prefect, who oversees national interests and the implementation of French law.

International agreements involving Canada are negotiated by the French state.

This creates several distinct institutional roles.

The territorial council can promote economic development. Local elected officials can seek investment and make political representations to Paris. Fishing enterprises can develop commercial proposals.

The prefecture represents France locally and participates in administrative cooperation.

The French government retains responsibility for international negotiations and the exercise of national powers.

Saint-Pierre can therefore advance an economic ambition without possessing the international authority necessary to carry out every part of that ambition.

That distinction is essential to understanding the proposed exploratory snow-crab fishery.

The Existing French Crab Fishery: What an Authorization Actually Looks Like

Before examining the disputed proposal, there is an important fact that deserves attention.

France already operates a regulated snow-crab fishery in waters under French sovereignty or jurisdiction near Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.

On April 24, 2026, the French government adopted a ministerial order establishing the 2026 management regime for snow crab in the French portion of NAFO subdivision 3Ps.²

The order sets a total allowable catch of 262 tonnes, allocated to Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon harvesters.

It also establishes a fishing season, permitted trap configurations, a minimum legal crab size of 95 millimetres, and a prohibition on retaining female snow crab.

Vessels must submit fishing reports. The rules also address documentation for catches landed in Canadian ports.

The order cites scientific advice from IFREMER dated April 13, 2026.

This is what a legally established fishery looks like.

There is a published authorization.

There is a defined management area.

There is an allowable catch.

There are conservation measures.

There are reporting obligations and enforcement provisions.

None of that establishes permission for the much larger exploratory proposal announced in September.

That proposal reportedly contemplated harvesting up to 1,500 tonnes of snow crab annually for five years in an area beyond Canada's 200-nautical-mile limit, associated with NAFO divisions 3LNO.³

The two fisheries must not be confused.

One is an existing regulated fishery in French waters.

The other is a proposed additional fishery in a disputed jurisdictional setting.

The distinction illustrates why a political promise cannot simply be treated as an extension of an existing authorization.

The Agreement That Separates Cooperation From Fisheries

The 1994 regional cooperation agreement is worth examining carefully.

It created a Joint Cooperation Commission whose members are appointed by Canada and France according to their respective procedures.

Canada identifies the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency as its current federal co-chair, with the Saint-Pierre prefecture serving as the French co-chair.⁴

The commission operates through subcommittees addressing economic and sustainable development, societal matters, security, and environment and science.

Its work can involve commercial partnerships, tourism, aquaculture, education, transportation, scientific exchange, and environmental cooperation.

Newfoundland and Labrador is among the Atlantic provinces encompassed by this arrangement.

The commission is therefore a legitimate channel for regional economic cooperation.

But it is not the bilateral fisheries authority.

The agreement expressly places fisheries relations within the separate Canada–France fisheries framework.

That separation matters because the language of regional cooperation can create the impression that all participating institutions possess comparable influence over decisions.

They do not.

A provincial development agency may help create a business partnership.

A French territorial official may promote a proposed fishery.

An Atlantic business organization may support improved transportation or commercial access.

None of these activities proves participation in fisheries negotiations.

The actual record must identify who attended the relevant meeting, in what capacity, and with what authority.

The Fisheries Table Has Its Own Rules

Canada and France signed their reciprocal fisheries agreement on March 27, 1972.

Following the 1992 maritime-boundary arbitration, the countries concluded a fisheries implementation arrangement in December 1994.

That arrangement established a bilateral advisory mechanism involving the competent fisheries authorities of both countries.

Its functions include recommending allowable catches and conservation measures for fisheries covered by the arrangement and maintaining records of its proceedings.⁵

This provides an established institutional pathway for addressing shared fisheries issues.

It does not establish that every proposed fishery is automatically covered by an existing allocation.

The species, location, applicable treaty provisions, and any proposed new authorization must be considered separately.

But the existence of this framework means fisheries cooperation between Canada and France is not dependent on informal discussions among neighbouring businesses or territorial officials.

There are governments responsible for the relationship.

There are agreements setting out their obligations.

There are procedures through which fisheries matters can be addressed.

And there are records that should be capable of establishing whether a particular proposal was discussed.

The central question is whether that formal machinery was used in relation to ASPM Océan's proposed exploratory fishery.

The material reviewed for this investigation does not establish that it was.

September 20: A Historic Visit, but Not a Fisheries Agreement

On September 20, 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney met French President Emmanuel Macron in Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.

The visit was historically significant. It marked the first official visit by a sitting Canadian prime minister to the archipelago.

The leaders discussed wider bilateral cooperation, including trade, economic integration, energy, technology, and security.

They also directed the Regional Joint Cooperation Commission to expand work in economic integration, energy transition, climate resilience, and cross-border security.⁶

This strengthened the broader regional cooperation framework.

But the Canadian account of the meeting did not announce a new snow-crab allocation.

It did not identify ASPM Océan as the beneficiary of a fisheries agreement.

It did not publish a new arrangement governing exploratory harvesting beyond 200 nautical miles.

And it did not establish that Newfoundland harvesters or processors had consented to such an arrangement.

These distinctions matter.

The meeting brought together two national leaders with the authority to influence diplomatic priorities.

It did not, on the available public record, produce an enforceable snow-crab agreement.

A photograph of two leaders together is evidence of a meeting.

It is not evidence of everything that might subsequently be attributed to that meeting.

The Proposal That Caught Canada by Surprise

Following Macron's visit, reports emerged that the French president had promised support for an exploratory snow-crab licence for ASPM Océan.

Éric Cormier, associated with the Saint-Pierre fishing enterprise, publicly discussed the anticipated licence.

The proposal reportedly involved up to 1,500 tonnes annually for five years.³

The company's commercial interest was clear.

Its legal authorization was not.

ASPM Océan is a fishing enterprise, not a government. Éric Cormier and Craig Clarke have appeared in the corporate and commercial records examined earlier in this series.

Those records help identify the participants in the business.

They do not establish that either individual possessed government authorization to fish in the proposed area.

Nor do they identify a completed Canadian landing, harvesting, financing, or processing agreement.

The announcement produced an immediate political response.

On September 29, Newfoundland and Labrador Premier Tony Wakeham publicly opposed France's pledged intention to establish the exploratory fishery.

Wakeham said he had spoken with federal Fisheries Minister Joanne Thompson and expressed support for protecting the province's fishery. He stated that Thompson had assured him Canada did not support the proposed action and that Fisheries and Oceans Canada was working with Global Affairs Canada on the matter.⁷

This is an important documentary finding.

Newfoundland and Labrador was not entirely absent from the response.

Its premier directly communicated with the federal minister and publicly stated the province's position.

That establishes provincial political participation.

It does not establish that the provincial government participated in a formal Canada–France negotiation before the announcement.

Those are different questions.

October 13: The Licence Still Had Not Been Issued

On October 13, France's ambassador to Canada, Hélène Farnaud-Defromont, stated that France had not issued the proposed exploratory licence.

She said France would not proceed without consulting Canada and emphasized that France intended to respect its existing fisheries agreements.⁸

Federal Fisheries Minister Joanne Thompson separately described the proposed fishery as not an active issue in ongoing Canada–France discussions.

The minister indicated that the French proposal had come as a surprise and that Global Affairs Canada had become involved following the announcement.⁹

These statements establish the latest publicly verified licence position located during this investigation.

The proposed exploratory licence had not been issued as of October 13.

France had publicly committed to consultation.

Canada had not described the proposal as an active bilateral fisheries negotiation.

As of this October 28 review, no later official document was located establishing that the proposed exploratory licence had been issued or that a formal crab-specific agreement had been concluded.

That is not proof that informal communication has stopped.

Nor is it proof that the proposal has been permanently abandoned.

An announcement is not an authorization.

An assurance of future consultation is not evidence that consultation has already occurred.

And diplomatic reassurance is not the same as a signed agreement.

The Continental Shelf Complicates the Question

The proposed fishing area raises a legal question that cannot be answered merely by pointing to the 200-nautical-mile limit.

Canada claims continental-shelf rights in the area associated with the proposed fishery.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal state possesses exclusive rights over the exploration and exploitation of natural resources on its continental shelf.

Those rights include qualifying sedentary species.

But the continental shelf and the waters above it are legally distinct.¹⁰

Canada's Fisheries Act contains provisions extending its application to sedentary species on the continental shelf beyond Canadian fisheries waters.¹¹

The implications for snow crab depend on the applicable statutory definition, the species' characteristics, the precise proposed fishing location, and the competing legal positions.

The 1992 maritime arbitration is part of that legal background, but it does not justify assuming that every disputed question beyond 200 nautical miles has already been resolved.

Canada has taken a clear public position opposing the proposed French activity.

That position deserves to be stated accurately.

So does the distinction between Canada's claimed continental-shelf rights and sovereignty over the water column.

Before any proposed exploratory fishery can be properly evaluated, the public needs the fishing coordinates and the legal basis on which France would claim authority to proceed.

Without those documents, the argument risks becoming a contest between political declarations rather than an examination of legal rights.

Newfoundland's Voice Exists, but Its Authority Is Limited

It would be inaccurate to conclude that Newfoundland and Labrador has no voice.

The province participates in the wider regional relationship with Saint-Pierre.

Its government can engage in economic-development discussions and represent provincial interests.

Its premier can communicate directly with federal ministers.

The September 29 statement demonstrates that this happened in the present controversy.

But provincial political influence is not the same as possessing independent treaty-making authority.

Canada conducts its international negotiations.

Fisheries and Oceans Canada exercises federal fisheries-management responsibilities.

Global Affairs Canada manages diplomatic relations and participates in international negotiations.

Newfoundland and Labrador has important responsibilities concerning provincial economic development, fish processing, infrastructure, and associated commercial activity.

Those responsibilities create legitimate provincial interests in the outcome of fisheries negotiations.

They do not automatically make the province a sovereign negotiating party.

The important distinction is between having a voice within Canadian decision-making and possessing the legal authority to decide the international outcome.

The public record shows provincial opposition.

It does not yet show whether Newfoundland officials participated in formal crab-specific discussions between Canada and France.

That missing record matters.

Harvesters, Processors, and Coastal Communities

The provincial government is not the only institution representing Newfoundland interests.

FFAW-Unifor represents harvesters and fish plant workers. The Association of Seafood Producers represents processing interests. Fleet organizations and individual licence holders also possess direct economic stakes in fisheries-management decisions.

These organizations can advocate, participate in consultation processes, negotiate commercial arrangements, and communicate with governments.

But representation is not the same as decision-making authority.

A harvester may possess a fishing licence without possessing authority over an international allocation.

A processor may negotiate commercial terms without participating in diplomatic negotiations.

A union may oppose a proposal without having a legal veto.

FFAW-Unifor president Dwan Street publicly objected to the proposed French fishery in September. She also acknowledged the existing commercial relationship between Saint-Pierre fishing enterprises and Newfoundland ports and processors.¹²

This demonstrates a Newfoundland harvesting representative engaging publicly with the issue.

It does not prove participation in a formal France–Canada negotiating process.

The distinction is important because political discussions can easily be described as consultation after the fact.

A meeting with an industry organization might establish that its views were heard.

It does not necessarily establish that those views influenced the decision.

Nor does it prove that the organization agreed with the outcome.

Indigenous Rights Are Not Merely Another Stakeholder Interest

Indigenous communities occupy a different legal position from ordinary commercial stakeholders where constitutionally protected Aboriginal or treaty rights are engaged.

Canada's Fisheries Act expressly recognizes constitutional protections for Indigenous peoples and requires consideration of adverse effects on protected rights in decisions under the Act.¹¹

Depending on the circumstances, a federal decision may also trigger the Crown's constitutional duty to consult.

That duty is not automatically established by the mere existence of a diplomatic discussion.

Its applicability depends on the relevant rights, the proposed Crown conduct, and the potential adverse effects.

But international negotiations cannot simply be used to disregard applicable constitutional obligations.

For the ASPM Océan proposal, the public material reviewed does not establish which Indigenous rights holders, if any, were consulted about the proposed exploratory fishery.

Nor does it establish that no consultation occurred.

This question requires examination of federal consultation records, the affected rights and harvesting areas, and confirmation from the relevant Indigenous governments or rights holders.

It should not be answered by assumption.

The Halibut Agreement Shows What a Negotiated Arrangement Looks Like

There is a recent comparison worth examining.

In September 2024, Canada and France reached an Atlantic halibut-sharing agreement following negotiations that had begun in 2016.

The arrangement allocated France 3 per cent of the total allowable catch established by Canada.

It also addressed authorized fishing areas, scientific cooperation, and potential Canadian economic benefits through landings in Canadian ports.¹³

This was a negotiated fisheries arrangement with identifiable terms.

It named the species.

It identified an allocation.

It established geographic conditions.

It described provisions for cooperation.

And it was publicly announced as an agreement.

The snow-crab proposal has not been accompanied by a comparable published arrangement.

That does not mean one could never be negotiated.

It means the public should not be asked to assume its existence.

The halibut agreement demonstrates that fisheries cooperation can produce specific commitments capable of independent examination.

That should be the standard applied to any proposed snow-crab arrangement.

Commercial Cooperation Is Not a Guarantee of Shared Benefits

Earlier articles in this series examined attempts to rebuild Saint-Pierre's fishing economy through public support, outside investment, commercial partnerships, and Canadian connections.

The Interpêche experience illustrated the risks of confusing investment with a sustainable business model.

Earlier crab proposals raised questions about harvesting access, processing capacity, transportation, and commercial feasibility.

ASPM Océan brings those questions into the present.

A new fishing opportunity could create economic activity for Saint-Pierre.

Canadian ports could benefit from vessel servicing and landings.

Canadian processors might gain additional business.

But those are possibilities, not established contractual obligations.

A meaningful partnership must identify who supplies the vessels, finances the operation, employs the workers, purchases the catch, handles processing, and bears the commercial risks.

Canada and France have previously negotiated arrangements containing such concrete requirements.

Amendments to their fisheries implementation framework addressed Canadian vessels harvesting specified French cod allocations and landing those catches in Saint-Pierre for processing. The provisions also contemplated agreements between Canadian fishing enterprises and French processors.¹⁴

Those arrangements illustrate what enforceable economic terms can look like.

They do not establish that comparable terms exist for ASPM Océan.

A symbolic partnership may be politically useful.

But a commercial commitment must be examined through its actual terms.

Who receives the revenue?

Who supplies the infrastructure?

Who carries the financial risk?

And what happens if the promised jobs or processing activity never materialize?

Until those questions are answered, mutual benefit remains a proposition rather than a demonstrated result.

The Wider Institutional Network

Saint-Pierre's economic relationship with Atlantic Canada extends beyond fisheries departments and diplomatic officials.

Business organizations, development agencies, transportation authorities, ports, and regional institutions can all participate in economic cooperation.

The Atlantic Francophone network also creates opportunities for cultural, educational, commercial, and regional connections.

Organizations such as the FFTNL, FCFA, Société Nationale de l'Acadie, and SANB can appear within this wider environment.

Their presence in a regional institutional network does not establish involvement in the ASPM Océan proposal.

That distinction is essential.

A shared meeting, an economic-development initiative, or participation in Francophone cooperation cannot be treated as proof of involvement in a particular fishing licence.

The relevant questions are whether an organization received information about the proposal, attended a meeting where it was discussed, provided financial or political support, or participated directly in negotiations.

No reviewed document establishes that these Francophone organizations negotiated the exploratory snow-crab proposal.

Their broader institutional relationships may warrant further examination, but participation must be established from records rather than inferred from proximity.

The Difference Between Being Consulted and Having Power

Five words are frequently used as though they mean the same thing.

They do not.

Consultation means seeking or considering another party's views. Its legal significance depends on the applicable framework.

Cooperation means working toward shared goals, but it does not necessarily produce enforceable obligations.

Negotiation means seeking agreement on terms. Negotiations may end without a decision.

Consent means agreement by a party whose approval is required under the relevant legal or contractual framework.

Authorization means that the competent authority has legally permitted an activity, ordinarily under specified conditions.

These differences determine who participates and what that participation actually accomplishes.

France can consult Canada without Canada agreeing.

Canada can negotiate with France without reaching an arrangement.

Newfoundland can express its position without controlling the federal decision.

Harvesters can be consulted without possessing a veto.

And a company can receive political encouragement without receiving legal authorization.

A government may call this cooperation.

But cooperation does not automatically mean consent.

Nor does consent by one government establish agreement among every affected community.

October 29–30: Another Diplomatic Table

The institutional questions raised by the snow-crab proposal arrive just as Canada prepares to host another major international meeting.

On October 25, Prime Minister Carney announced that Canada would host the Canada–European Union Summit in Montréal on October 29–30.

The published priorities include economic cooperation, trade, technology, energy, security, and closer strategic relations between Canada and Europe.¹⁵

Saint-Pierre's proposed snow-crab fishery is not identified as an agenda item.

That does not prove the issue cannot arise privately or in a separate diplomatic discussion.

Nor does the presence of European leaders establish that France and Canada are negotiating a fisheries arrangement.

The summit is important because it illustrates the broader environment in which governments increasingly emphasize economic integration, strategic partnerships, and international cooperation.

Those objectives may be worthwhile.

But they do not replace the need to examine the legal and commercial terms of particular decisions.

The people affected by those decisions deserve more than assurances that governments maintain a good relationship.

They deserve to know what the relationship actually produces.

The Local Paradox Has a Name

In their 2022 study, “The Local Paradox in Grand Policy Schemes: Lessons from Newfoundland and Labrador,” Kristof Van Assche, Robert Greenwood, and Monica Gruezmacher examined the recurring difficulty of implementing development policies when local institutions lack the authority, resources, or capacity to influence decisions taken at higher levels.¹⁶

Their analysis identified a central contradiction.

Large development strategies depend on local participation and knowledge.

But genuinely empowered local institutions can also challenge or resist the very strategies higher authorities wish to implement.

That is not necessarily a failure of governance.

It can be an essential democratic safeguard.

The Saint-Pierre fisheries relationship presents a practical example of this problem.

There are national governments with international authority.

There are territorial and provincial institutions with recognized interests.

There are businesses seeking commercial opportunities.

There are harvesting and processing organizations representing livelihoods.

And there are communities whose economic futures may be affected by decisions made elsewhere.

These participants are not powerless.

But they do not possess equal authority.

A provincial government can be politically influential without controlling the treaty process.

An industry association can be consulted without determining the allocation.

A community can receive a promised economic benefit without negotiating the terms.

That is the table beside the table.

Not necessarily a secret gathering.

Not necessarily an improper process.

But an institutional arrangement in which participation and authority are distributed unequally.

The problem begins when the language of cooperation obscures that inequality.

Before Anyone Calls It Mutual Benefit

As of October 28, 2026, the latest verified public position remains that the proposed exploratory snow-crab licence has not been issued.

France's ambassador has emphasized consultation and respect for existing agreements.

Canada's fisheries minister has indicated that the proposal was not an active matter in ongoing discussions.

Newfoundland and Labrador's premier has publicly opposed the proposed activity.

The institutional framework is well established.

Canada and France possess a fisheries relationship governed by international agreements.

The two countries also maintain a separate regional cooperation framework involving Atlantic Canada and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.

Newfoundland and Labrador has a recognized political and economic voice in that relationship.

But the available public record does not establish that Newfoundland harvesters, processors, municipalities, or Indigenous communities participated in formal negotiations over ASPM Océan's proposed exploratory fishery.

Before coastal communities are asked to accept any claim that a future arrangement represents cooperation, partnership, or mutual benefit, they should be able to examine the actual documents.

They need the proposed fishing coordinates and the legal authority under which the fishery would operate.

They need the licence or authorization and its complete conditions.

They need the relevant Canada–France correspondence and any resulting written agreement.

They need the scientific assessment and conservation measures.

They need records showing who was consulted, when, and about what.

They need the agreements governing vessels, landings, processing, financing, and employment.

They need to know whether Canadian businesses or governments have made financial commitments.

They need to know who bears liability if environmental or economic damage occurs.

And they need to know what opportunity exists for affected harvesters, processors, Indigenous rights holders, and coastal communities to object, negotiate, or seek remedies.

These documents would not guarantee an outcome everyone considers fair.

But they would permit the public to examine the arrangement on its merits.

France has legitimate interests in Saint-Pierre's economic future.

Canada has responsibilities concerning its maritime rights and fisheries management.

Newfoundland harvesters and coastal communities have legitimate interests in the protection of their livelihoods.

Those interests may overlap.

They are not identical.

Cooperation is not demonstrated by the number of governments, organizations, or businesses gathered around a table.

It is demonstrated by the commitments they make, the benefits and risks they share, and the opportunities available to affected people to influence the outcome.

Until the relevant documents are available, the question at the centre of this series remains unanswered.

When the governments finish talking, who actually gets to decide—and who is left living with the decision? 

Related Bayman's Paradox Reading

Saint-Pierre’s Fishing Future — and Newfoundland’s Crab

https://baymansparadox.com/post/saint-pierres-fishing-future-and-newfoundlands-crab

The Interpêche File: Public Money, Canadian Capital, and a Failed Fisheries Revival

https://baymansparadox.com/post/the-interpeche-file-public-money-canadian-capital-and-a-failed-fisheries-revival

The Crab Plans That Came Before

https://baymansparadox.com/post/the-crab-plans-that-came-before

Before the Crab Licence: The Making of ASPM Océan

https://baymansparadox.com/post/before-the-crab-licence-the-making-of-aspm-ocean

The Mission That Connected Oil, Seafood, and Saint-Pierre

https://baymansparadox.com/post/the-mission-that-connected-oil-seafood-and-saint-pierre

The Shelf Dispute Beneath the Crab Story

https://baymansparadox.com/post/the-shelf-dispute-beneath-the-crab-story

References